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HEADNOTE: When an investor, for example a transnational corporation,
invests abroad it runs the risk that its investment will be expropriated for the simple
reason that international contracts are practically impossible to enforce. Any agreements
or contracts then undertaken by the transnational company and the host country must be
designed to be self-enforcing. It could be possible for the host country and the
transnational corporation to find such self-enforcing agreements if there are future gains
from trade. Thus although the host country might have a short-term incentive to
expropriate it has a long-term incentive to foster good relations with potential investors to
attract more investment in the future. This conflict between short-term and long-term
incentives determines the type of investment contracts agreed. This paper extends
previous work on the general underprovision of investment when contracts are incomplete
or only partially enforceable (see e.g. Grout, 1984) to a dynamic context. It is likewise
shown that investment is initially underprovided but it increases over time and for certain
parameter values it tends to the efficient level. The expected future discounted returns to
the transnational company declines over time, extending Vernon's observation of the
obsolecing bargain (Vernon, 1971). The model is also extended to allow for capital
accumulation and consideration Is given to renegotiation-proof contracts.
* The support of the Deutsche Forschungsgeineinschaft through SFB 178 at the Universitat Konstanz is
gratefully acknowleged. We thank Keith Cowling for comments on an earlier draft.1. INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment accounts for a considerable proportion of international capital flows. In 1986
the flow of foreign direct investment from developed market economies to developing countries was $12.5
billion or roughly one-half of all private capital flows from the developed to the developing nations (and
roughly one-quarter of the flow of all foreign direct investments). Its significance for developing countries
may even grow in the future as debt is swapped for equity (see Pollio and Riemschneider, 1988). The most
important sector in volume term is the manufacturing sector, the concern of this paper. In 1978 total stocks
of manufacturing foreign direct investment accounted for roughly two-thirds of the total in less developed
countries, with just one-eighth devoted to the extractive industries (see Stopford and Dunning, 1983, p.22).
All foreign direct investment, including that going to developing countries , is subject to expropriation
risk. The legal right of host countries to expropriate foreign-owned property within their territory subject to
their own tribunals is well established . Capital exporters nevertheless believe that their property is entitled
to some protection under international law. The United States for example was instrumental in setting up
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes which provides a forum for settling
investment disputes. But although its judgements are legally binding it cannot ultimately extract more
compensation than the host country is willing to pay^. The United States generally expects any
compensation to be prompt, adeqate and effective. Its claims could in principle be backed up by using the
Export-Import Bank to deny credit to expropriating countries or invoking the Hickenlooper or Gonzalez
Amendments (imposing aid sanctions or withdrawing support for loans from multilateral agencies) but in
1. The UK, for example, changed its North Sea basic tax rate several times from a rate of 45% in 1978 to
75% in 1982.
2. This principle is enunciated by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3281,1974, Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, which states: "Each State has the right to.... nationalize, expropriate,
or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the
State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances
the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it
shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals".
3. The newly created Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency offers somewhat better protection in that
all members including members from less developed countries make a direct contribution and a certain
peer group pressure may emerge to discourage expropriation but the effect is likely to be marginal.practice it has been loath to do so for fear of worsening its international relations (see Sigmund, 1980,
p.331)
4.
The period up to 1978 saw a large number of expropriations. Between 1960 and 1976 at least 1535
firms were forced to divest (either by direct expropriation, forced sale, forced renegotiation of contract
resulting in ownership transfer or through extra-legal acts) in 76 different less developed countries (see
Kobrin, 1980, p.73). The book value of these firms represented 4.4% (3.3% if agriculture is excluded) of
the total stock, including expropriated assets, of partially or wholly foreign-owned firms in the
expropriating countries at the end of 1976. The period 1956-72 was even more striking with nearly 20% of
all assets being expropriated without compensation (see Williams, 1975 p.265) .
In the post 1978 period in contrast there have been no major expropriations (see Chaudhuri, 1988).
There may be many reasons for this. It could be that the political situation is inherently more stable.
Certainly many past expropriations were primarily politically motivated following changes in regime, such
as in Cuba, 1959-60 or in Chile 1971-2, or following independence, as in Angola 1975 or Tanzania 1967.
However we take the view that many expropriations and acts of forced divestment were determined by
largely economic considerations and are therefore amenable to economic analysis ,. There may then be
4. The case of the Hickenlooper Amendment is perhaps instructive. In 1962 the Brazilian government
nationalised the telecommunications company, Compania Telefonica Nacional. Its failure to promptly
agree compensation led to the passing of the Amendment through the U.S. congress. It required the
President to suspend aid to any government that expropriated U.S.-owned investment and failed witin six
months to honour its obligations under international law, as seen by the U.S. The Amendment was invoked
only once (see Akinsanya, 1980) in 1963 against Sri Lanka which had nationalised the oil/petrol distribution
facilities of Texaco, Esso Standard Eastern and Standard Oil in the previous year. The effect of the
imposition was that the Sri Lankan government proceeded to nationalise virtually all other petroleum
marketing facilities: they had lost their foreign aid anyway so had nothing further to lose. Similar
experiences in Peru and Bolivia led to the view that foreign aid sanctions were as likely to endanger U.S.
assets abroad as to protect them. The Hickenlooper Amendment was gradually watered down and was to
all intents and purposes dropped in 1973.
5. Most of this figure was accounted for by Cuba. In June, 1960, Castro proclaimed, "We'll take and take
until not even the nails of their shoes are left."
6. Although this distinction is very difficult to make in practice Kobrin (1980, p.69) concludes that "in the
post 1960 period mass-ideologically-motivated expropriations took place in only a small minority of
countries that forced divestment of foreign direct investment. In the other cases forced divestment was a
means rather than an end. It is one of a number of policy options available to attempt to increase national
control over foreign investors".
7. Eaton and Gersovitz (1983,1984) make the distinction between endogenous expropriation risk, where
the expropriation decision is determined by primarily economic factors and exogenous expropriation risk -
determined by largely political factorseconomic explanations why fewer expropriations took place in the 1980's than in the 1960's and 70's. One
possible reason is the general excess supply particularly of primary products which makes expropriation
less attractive, together with the perception of a large downside risk which makes host countries more
willing to share risk, i.e. potential losses, with transnational corporations. Many so-called new forms of
investment emerged in the 1970's, that is those involving less than 50% equity participation by the
o
transnational corporation, although these are again becoming less popular . "Fade-in" agreements that
allow for a gradual transfer of ownership to the host country also became popular in the early seventies , as
did contracts with accelerated depreciation (so the host country gets a smaller income in the early years).
Most studies of the relations between the host country and the transnational corporation use a bilateral
monopoly framework. This is, according to Kobrin (1987), ".Jhe currently accepted paradigm of HC-MNC
relations in international political economy." A clear exposition is given by Kindleberger (1969, lecture 5).
The host country has an investment opportunity that it is unable exploit itself, either because it does not
have the technical know-how or because its access to capital markets is restricted, but which the
transnational corporation can exploit as it has the necessary capital, technology, marketing and managerial
skills. The host country has control over access and conditions of operation. It is then argued (see e.g
Penrose, 1959) that the actual outcome will depend on the relative bargaining strenghs of the host country
and the transnational corporation. The lower bound on the return to the transnational corporation is just
sufficient to cover the supply price of capital where the transnational corporation makes no economic
profit and the upper bound is that level where the host country would just prefer to leave the opportunity
unexploited.
The one period model is, however, inappropriate for studying expropriation risk since if there were
just one period, or indeed a final period, the host country would certainly expropriate and knowing this the
transnational corporation would not be prepared to invest. We therefore consider an infinitely repeated
version of the bilateral monopoly model and suppose the transnational corporation and the host country
negotiate a long-run contract specifying how much is to be invested in each period and how much of output
8. See Oman (1989) on these new forms of investment.
9. The Andean Pact countries required new foreign firms to sell 51% of ownership over a 15-20 year period
(see Sigmund, 1980, p.289-90). These clauses have recently been made much less rigid.is to be transferred to the host country at each date-state. The host country can, because of its sovereign
status, renege on the contract and confiscate the whole of output without legal sanction. The transnational
corporation can choose to withdraw and not to invest in the future. The only feasible contracts then are
self-enforcing in which the long-term benefits from adhering to the contract exceed any short-term gams to
be had by reneging. Such self-enforcing or implicit contracts are enforced by the threat to return to autarky
following any infringement. Even though such contracts represent a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the
repeated game between the host country and the transnational corporation, the threat to return to autarky
if carried out may be subject to renegotiation. Renegotiation-proof contracts will be examined in Sectin 6.
Self-enforcement, however, is a minimal requirement and the main purpose of this paper is to study these
long-run, self-enforcing, investment contracts .
If host countries generally have a short-term incentive to expropriate they have a long-term incentive to
foster good relations in order to encourage investment in the future. In practice host countries have tried
numerous ways to encourage investment (see Reuber, 1973, p.126-30 and Guisinger, 1985, p.19-33)
including tarrif and import quotas, duty-free import of inputs, direct subsidies and tax holidays which
exempt the transnational corporation from tax obligations for a limited period. But the more the
transnational corporation is encouraged to invest the greater is the temptation for the host country to
expropriate . Transnational corporations therefore must and do develop strategies to forestall
expropriation. There are a number of possibilities. The cultivation of local support is one way. Others
include locating different parts of an activity in different countries or using a technology that is difficult to
operate without outside ^elp (see Eaton and Gersovitz, 1984, p.27-28) or continuously producing new
innovations (Gabriel, 1966) or holding back crucial investments. Moran (1985, p.113) for example cites
evidence from the chemical and petrochemical industries that "corporate strategists deviated from both
10. Self-enforcing wage contracts are considered in Thomas and Worrall (1988), but in that model no
investment decision is made.
11. Bronfrenbrenner (1954-55, p.215) saw no resolution of this problem and suggested that the best policy
for the developed world was to withdraw into an economic "neo-isolationism".engineering and economic optimality to stage investments in a series that would provide them something
new to offer when host authorities pressed in .
Despite this evidence it may be thought that since the underlying structure of the model is stationary,
the production function is independent of time and states are u.d., the optimal contract will itself be
stationary. Indeed as the production function is concave there is clearly a cost to having investment change
over time. Suppose then that the contract is stationary, that investment is constant and that, following the
bargaining strength model, the host country gets a certain constant percentage share of profits each period.
Ideally investment should be at the efficient level where expected marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
This would be sustainable if the share going to the host country and the discount factor were high enough
so that future benefits were attractive enough. Otherwise the host country will have an incentive to
confiscate current output rather than wait for the future returns. Such a contract is not self-enforcing. The
contract can be made self-enforcing by reducing the investment level; it never pays to increase the
investment level since this increases the temptation to renege and at the same time reduces the level of
profit to be shared out. This then is a stationary self-enforcing contract with underinvestment. It is however,
possible to do better. If the host country is risk neutral (Section 3) it is only interested in the value of
discounted payments and not when they actually occur. Then delaying payments does not affect the current
investment level but as the time approaches when the payments are due the temptation to renege is
diminshed since seen from that date expected future payments are higher and so future investment can be
raised without causing the host country to renege. Since investment in the future is higher so too are the
transnational corporation's profits and thus a better contract has been found. Of course investment can not
rise without limit and eventually either the efficient investment level will be attained or the host country will
end up taking all the expected profits - depending on the discount factor. Essentially this policy of delaying
payments and investments makes the threat to return to autarky more effective by increasing the cost of any
deviation. If the host country is risk averse then it will care about the timing of the transfers made by the
12. Jenkins (1986, p.163-64) quotes the case of the Canadian Cold Lake Tar Sands project sponsored by
Imperial Oil. Imperial cancelled the project in 1981 following falling oil prices and the introduction of the
National Energy Program. The project was later resumed but investment was to proceed in six separate
stages. As one executive explained; "There are a lot of uncertainties in these investments. We want to make
sure the incentives are still there".transnational corporation. Nevertheless it is shown in Section 4 that the same result goes through provided
the host country is not too risk averse.
Another feature of the optimal contract is that investment moves pro-cyclically and transfers are
positively serially correlated. When output is high there is a greater temptation for the host country to
confiscate output. To offset this more must be offered by the contract in the future. A contrasting argument
is made by King (1988). He argues that governments best maintain office by managing a steady growth in
income. In that case a positively serially correlated pattern of tax revenues is likely to lead to unstable
governments. This is of course an empirical question. King finds some support for his hypothesis that tax
revenues are counter-cyclical from data on bauxite mining in Jamaica.
We make contributions to two strands of the the literature; first to the literature on the obsolescing
bargain (see Vernon, 1971) and tax holidays, and second to the literature on the sub-optimality of
investment when contracts are incomplete or not fully enforceable. In particular we obtain a strong
characterization of the time structure of investment whereas in previous models investment is chosen just
once.
Kirideleberger (1969, lecture 5) suggested that the bargaining strengh of the host country might tend to
increase over time. The theme was taken up by Vernon (1971,p.46-59) under the title of "the obsolescing
bargain" where the sunk investment of the transnational corporation is held to ransom by the host country
(for empirical support see e.g. Moran, 1973). This model was initially applied only to the resource sector.
However doubt has been cast on its applicability to the manufacturing sector (see Kobrin, 1987). Bennett
and Sharpe (1979) even suggest that bargaining power may shift in favour of the transnational corporation.
They cite evidence from the Mexican car industry that local capital becomes increasingly dependent on the
transnational corporation and provides a powerful lobby for the transnational corporation's cause. Our
results suggest that the obsolescing bargain argument does apply to the manufacturing sector and that
where there are countervailing effects that these must be especially strong to overcome the general
tendency of the host countries returns to increase over time.
The taxation of foreign direct investment is considered in Gersovitz (1987). He notes that tax holidays,
which concentrate the benefits to the transnational corporation in the early periods, have a number of
shortcomings, such as the difficulty of distinguishing between old and new projects, the encouragementthey give to projects with short gestation periods and with rapidly depreciating equipment and concludes
that they are probably not desirable. But their existence suggests that they might have offsetting benefits.
An explanation along the lines of the obsolescing bargaining model can be found in Doyle and van
Wijnbergen (1984). They argue that once a firm has entered the host country and incurred the set up costs
the bargaining power of the host country increases and it exploits the lock-in effect to increase taxes. Bond
and Samuelson (1986) offer a slighly different interpretation. They argue that tax holidays act as a signal.
Firms are unable to directly identify high from low productivity countries until they are actually located
there. High productivity countries offer tax holidays as a signal, which low-productivity countries cannot
always mimic becuase the future rise in tax rate required to recoup the initial subsidy would drive the firm
out of a low productivity country. Our model in contrast does not rely on any fixed costs or information
asymmetry or any change in the underlying economic structure to motivate tax holidays although their
length is history dependent rather than pre-determined. Further it allows for uncertainty and an
endogenous investment decision.
As stated earlier we show that investment tends to the efficient level or stabilizes below it so there is
certainly underinvestment in the initial periods. This underinvestment is caused by the host country's
inability to commit not to expropriate. That specific assets tend to be underinvested when their quasi-rents
can be appropriated has been a concern of the transactions cost literature (see e.g. Williamson, 1975 and
Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978) ^ Grout (1984) provides a formal analysis (see also Tirole, 1986), In
Grout's model binding contracts are too costly to write or enforce and the division of the rents between
labour and stockholders is determined ex post by a Nash bargain. If labour has any bargaining power at all
it will appropriate some of the economic returns to capital, and so ex ante stockholders will provide too
little capital.
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) suggest that the risk of appropriation may be tempered by vertical
integration of buyer and seller or by explicit or implicit contractual arrangements. Grossman and Hart
(1986) consider vertical integration and Hart and Moore (1988) study explicit but incomplete contracts in
which trade and non-trade prices are enforceable. They show that investment is also generally under-
13. Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) note the "relevance for private investments in underdeveloped,
politically unstable, that is 'opportunistic' countries".provided. (A similar conclusion is obtained by Crawford (1988) where the investment is contractable but
buyer and seller are risk averse). Our model has many similar features; investment is not contractible and
risk aversion does not play a key role. Here we examine the implicit contractual arrangements between the
transnational corporation and host country (vertical integration is impossible and we have argued that
explicit contracts are difficult to enforce across national boundaries). This has the added advantage that
investment is repeated (capital accumulated in Section 5), so the time structure of investment can be
considered, whereas in all previous models investment occurs only once.
Eaton and Gersovitz (1983,1984) provide one of the few analyses of endogenous expropriation risk .
In the static version of their model Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) show that for certain production functions
and parameter values the transnational corporation will underinvest capital. The static nature of the model
however, leads to the rather forced assumption that the host country decides whether to expropriate or not
before the transnational corporation commits itself to supply the managers necessary to operate the
already installed capital equipment. In Eaton and Gersovitz (1983) a dynamic model is presented in which
the threat of withdrawl of future capital is used to forestall expropriation. This is the approach adopted
here. However in their model each foreign investor makes only a negligible contribution to output so the
strategic interactions between the transnational corporation and the host country which we examine here
are excluded.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the model; Section 3 examines the case of a risk
neutral host country and presents a simple example; Section 4 deals with the risk averse case. Section 5
introduces capital and Section 6 looks at renegotiation-proof contracts. An appendix justifies the dynamic
programming approach used and provides proofs.
2. MODEL
At each date T = 1,2,..., <» there is a state of nature s = 1,2,...,N. The state of nature is i.i.d. over time and
the probability of state s is p independent of time. There are two goods: a capital and a consumption good.
The price of the capital good is constant over time and set equal to unity. (One possible interpretation of
the state of nature is however as a variable consumption good price.) The consumption good can only be
14. The implications of exogenous expropriation risk - determined by largely political factors - for capital
flight is considered in Kahn and Haque (1986) and for natural resourse extraction rates in Long (1975).9
produced in the host country with the help of foreign capital. The transnational corporation provides the
capital good to the host country when it invests. Together with the investment, I provided by the
transnational corporation the state of nature determines output at each date through the
production/restricted profit function r(I;s). Investment is chosen before the state of nature is known. It is
assumed that r(I;s) is twice continuously differentiable in I, increasing and concave in I, r(0:s) ^0, and by
convention increasing in s. Further it is assumed that E[r(I;s)] is strictly concave, with E[r(I;s)]-I positive for
some I > 0 and bounded above, so that there is a unique, positive solution I* satisfying E[r'(I*;s)] = 1 with
positive per-period profits. Output is non-durable and must be consumed straightaway. In this section it is
assumed that capital completely depreciates in one period. Section 5 allows for less than complete
depreciation.
The transnational corporation transfers tg to the host country in state s, or more acurately the host
country retains an amount r(I;s)-t . More than the entire output of the consumption good cannot be
retained by the host country and neither can the transnational corporation take more than current output
out of the host country, that is, it is assumed
(2.1) r(I;s)-ts>0 s = l,2,...,N
(2.2) ts2>0 s = l,2,...,N.
The sequence of events at any date T is illustrated in Figure 1. At date T, the first decision is taken by
the transnational corporation when it decides if and how much to invest, I being contingent upon what has
happened in the past. Then nature chooses state s and the output produced is r(I;s). The host country then
decides how much the transnational corporation has to transfer to it, again contingent on history, and may
if it wishes confiscate the whole of output. Considering just date T the host country will want to do just that
and keep all of the output for itself. If it does so the transnational corporation is unlikely to invest in the
future and the host country will lose the future output.
Consider then an infinite horizon contract which specifies I and t at each date. This contract cannot
be enforced at law because of the host country's sovereign status. The contract then must be self-enforcing.
15. This constraint does not bind in the model of Section 3.10
It is assumed that once the host country deviates from the agreed contract by confiscating output the
transnational corporation will not invest again in the future and if the transnational corporation deviates
from the agreed on investment the host country will confiscate. Such a policy is a credible perfect
equilibrium strategy in the repeated game between the transnational corporation and the host country: it
drives both parties down to the autarky level, which also must be the most severe punishment (the minimax
and hence the "optimal" punishment).
Nothing yet has been said about the attitude to risk of the transnational corporation and the host
country. It will be assumed that the transnational corporation is a well diversified enterprise with a large
number of independent projects and thus is risk neutral and discounts the future by a constant factor a < 1.
The host country is assumed to have a utility function v(t), defined over transfer payments, normalized so
that v(0) = 0, and to discount future utility by the same factor a as the transnational corporation. In the next
section it is assumed that v(t) is linear and in Section 4 it is assumed that it is strictly concave.
Some comments are in order about the assumptions of this model. We have modeled the problem as a
two person game. As remarked in the introduction this is the traditional approach. We also saw there is
good evidence to suppose that the transnational corporation cannot in general expect concrete support
from either its home government or other transnational corporations. This is somewhat different from the
situation with international debt where numerous cross-default clauses interlink investors. Indeed the
incentive structure with debt is different from that of foreign direct investment: the host country might for
example wish to save out of output so as to be able itself to finance projects in the future, or indeed it may
choose to consume part of the current loan; these possibilities do not exist when the transnational
corporation is providing not only capital but also technology and expertise not otherwise available to the
host country . Further the informational problems seem more severe: the lender may have to monitor to
ensure that the host country is actually devoting the money lent to the specified project.
Let Vc denote the maximum future utility the host country can get, assuming it abides by the contract, s
from the beginning of date t +1, discounted to date t +1, when the state at date t was s. The host country
will not wish to seize output at if
16. Another reason for not interpreting this model in the debt context is that it would be subject to the
criticism of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) that if the expected future value of debt were positive the host
country could do better by reneging and investing in cash-in-advance contracts.11
(2.3) vs s
The RHS of this inequality is simply the one-period utility of output. Here we are making the
assumptions that the host country is excluded from future investment if it expropriates and that it cannot
operate the project itself even if some investment is in place. If the host country could use a less efficient
technology than the transnational corporation it would be necessary to add further terms to the RHS, but
this would not qualitatively affect theanalysis. We shall add a term to the RHS when we consider
renegotiation-proof contracts in Section 6.
Let U(V ) be the corresponding future utility at date t +1 of the transnational corporation. It will be,
prepared to invest at date t +1 provided it gets something out of the contract in the future, i.e. provided
(2.4) U(Vs)>0 s = l,2,...,
The optimal value function is a fixed point of the dynamic programming problem of choosing
(I,(ts,Vs)) to maximize-I+ E[r(I;s)-tg +aU(Vs)] subject to (2.1)-(2.4) and
(2.5) E[v(ts) + aVs]>V
The latter constraint is a contract consistency constraint that says that what was promised in the past
must be delivered. We shall let pg8s, PSTTS, ps|JLs,
 aPs<Ps> ^d cr be the multipliers for these constraints.
Then starting from some initial value of V, say V^, the initial values of investment and transfers must solve
this dynamic programming problem and the value V will be determined by Vs from the actual state that
1 • 17
occurs; the problem is then solved given V to determine the second period values, and so on .
This is not a straightforward dynamic programming problem because of the presence of the optimal
value function in the constraint set, and the usual contraction mapping arguments cannot be used.
Nevertheless it is shown in the Appendix (Lemma 1) that the optimal value function can be found by
repeated application of a mapping starting from the first-best frontier.
17. For discussion of this method of solution the reader is refered to Thomas and Worrall (1988). The
optimality equation actually characterizes the Pareto-frontier, U(V), of the equilibrium pay-off set of the
repeated game between the host country and the transnational corporation, and is a part of the set-valued
mapping which defines all equilibrium pay-offs (see Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti; 1986). Attention can be
restricted to the Pareto-frontier as the contiuation pay-offs must also be Pareto efficient and because in this
case the optimal punishments do not depend on knowledge of the entire pay-off set.12
3. RISK NEUTRAL HOST COUNTRY
In this section we assume the host country to be risk neutral. We state this as
ASSUMPTION A: The host country is risk neutral: v(t)=t.
This would be an appropriate assumption for a country which does have access to capital markets so
that it can insure itself against fluctuations in the terms of trade but does not have the technical skills
needed to exploit its investment opportunities, or if the project is small relative to national output.
The shape of the value function U(V) is illustrated in Figure 2. In the range [O.Vj^], U is horizontal
at UCVj^jg). Equation (2.5) is a strict inequality in this range; if V=0, for example, and (2.5) held as an
equality then each Vg and tg must equal zero. But as any positive level of investment will yield a positive
level of output that could be expropriated the transnational corporation must offer the host country at least
some positive level of expected future utility to prevent expropriation. At V^^ ^
e constraint (2.5) begins
to bind and thereafter U declines as a function of V to the point Vmax, where U(Vmax) =0. The function
U is concave in this range (Lemma 2); essentially a convex combination of any two self-enforcing contracts
can be made self-enforcing by transfering any extra output directly to the host country and it will offer the
host country and the transnational corporation at least the average from the original contracts. It is this
range of the function that represents the Pareto frontier because to operate below it or in the range
(OjVjjjjjj) would be inefficient: both parties could gain by a move to the frontier.
As the transnational corporation is interested in maximizing profits it will initially choose the
contractual terms such that U is at a maximum and hence it is efficient to set V^ = V|T1-T|. This is consistent
with a situation in which the transnational corporation has all the bargaining power or where there are
more investment opportunities than there are resources capable of exploiting them. Other distributions of
the surplus are found by choosing the initial value of V to be higher than Vrn-n.
It will be helpful as a benchmark case to consider the first-best situation where the self-enforcing
constraints are ignored. Investment each period will maximize E[r(I;s)]-I, and hence satisfy E[r'(I*;s)] = 1.
By assumption there is a unique solution I*, where E[r(I*;s)]-I* >0 so that per-period profits are positive;
we shall call I* is the efficient level of investment. The Pareto-frontier will be a straight line with slope -1.
The path of transfer payments associated with any point on this frontier is not uniquely determined (though
it must satisfy 0 £ tg < r(I*;s)) as the host country is risk neutral and both parties discount at the same rate.13
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The first step in unravelling the second-best problem is to notice that the constraints (2.1) can be
ignored (see Lemma 3, Appendix). With this in mind the first order conditions for the dynamic
programming problem are, together with the complementary slackness conditions,
(3.1) E[r'(I;s)(l-M,s)] = l
(3.2) ^s + cr = l-irs s = l,2,...,N
(3.3) -(n,s + a)/(l + <ps)EaU(Vs) s = l,2,...,N
The notation 3U(Vg) represents the set of superdifferentials of the value function at Vs. If 6U(V ) is
differentiable at V_ then the set consists of a single number, say -crc, with cr(l + <p_) = (|x_ + a) and
cr =-U'(V ). There is also an "envelope condition"
(3.4) -o-eaU(V).
This implies that if there is a unique value of a for which (3.1)-(3.3) hold, then U(V) is differentiable at
V. The relationship between a and V is a non-decresing u.h.c. correspondence. It may however have
horizontal sections where U is linear or vertical parts where U is not differentiable. It will be useful for the
moment to assume that U is diffentiable so (3.1)-(3.4) are equalities. Then a equals the value of a in the
following period's maximization problem. It will be shown that U is not diffentiable for all parameter
values; nevertheless each choice variable is continuous in V even at points of non-differentiability. Further
it will be shown that the value function has an absolute slope less than or equal to 1 and is strictly concave
whenever the absolute slope is less than 1 (Lemmas 3 and 4).
It can be seen straightaway that or > o* since \is > 0 and if cp$ > 0 then org is at its maximum value, o"max»
and by definition a > o\ Thus the absolute slope of the value function is non-decreasing over time and
from (3.3) will only increase if |x > 0, where s is the state occuring today (if CT < vmax and jxs > 0 then
as > a, and if a = ormax and ,xs > 0 then (Ts = a = (Tmax and n > 0).
Translating this updating rule for CT into one for V
7, the value of V at date T, we have that in those
states where the host country's self-enforcing constraint is not binding (jxs = O), V
7 remains constant
(Vg = V); and for states in which it does bind (JJLS > 0) and when V < Vmax, V* increases (Vg > V): if V* is14
already at its maximum value Vmax then it stays there. Since V can be regarded as the state variable of the
process determining the optimal solution, and as tg, Vg and I are monotonically related to V (Lemma 7),
we have the fundamental observation that the contract evolves according to a "ratchet effect", sometimes
increasing, sometimes staying the same, but never falling °.
Next we want to relate the transfer, t and investment, I to V. To do this we need to know something of
the value of o\ In Lemma 3 it is shown that or <, 1. Intuitively, in the first-best contract the trade-off would
be one-to-one. The first-best may be obtained but if so only for that part of a contract starting from high
values of V where the host country gets sufficient utility from the first-best contract so that its self-
enforcing constraint never binds. We shall say that the first best level of investment is sustainable for such a
V. If the self-enforcing constraint binds in no state, then cr=1 and I* is sustainable.. Let V* be the smallest
level of V such that I* is sustainable (see Lemma 4). As V is reduced below V* the utility the host country
gets falls below the utility obtained by confiscating the output, r(I*;s). Thus a one unit reduction in V will
lead to a less than one unit gain in U. So a falls below 1. If the first-best cannot be sustained even for high
values of V (remember U has to be non-negative) then CT is always less than 1. In principle there are three
possible cases. Firstly no non-trivial contract may exist. This will be true under certain circumstances if a is
small (see Proposition 2 below) If a non-trivial contract does exist there are two cases depending on
whether it is possible to sustain the efficient level of investment in a self-enforcing way or not. If I* is
sustainable, U has a slope of -1 on the interval [V*,V ] and U is strictly concave, differentiate and
I < I* on the interval [Vmjjj.V*). If efficiency is not sustainable, U is strictly concave on [Vmin.VjjjgJ,
though not everywhere differentiate, has a slope whose absolute value is less than 1 and I is always less
than I* (see Lemmas 4,7 and 8).
Consider some value of a strictly less than 1 (the starting value is by assumption 0). If or < 1 and <pg=0
then from (3.3) jis + a < 1, and from (3.2) TT& > 0 so that tg = 0. (If tg > 0 then irg = 0 and from (3.2) iig > 0
and from (3.3) either a = 1 or a < 1 and <p > 0.) That is unless ag=crmax (which follows from cp& > 0) or
<j& = 1, the transfer is zero. So the optimal rule is to make no transfers to the host country until either Vmax
or efficiency is attained. Intuitively it does not matter for discounted utilities when the host country receives
18. This is different from the ratchet effect identified by Laffont and Tirole (1988). There an agent who
reveals too much good information in the first period faces a stiffer incentive scheme in the second period..15
the transfers. But the presence of the host country's self-enforcement constaint means that it pays to delay
the transfer to offer a "carrot" to prevent reneging. Once V is reached, however, any further
postponement would make it worthwhile for the transnational corporation to renege at some future date
when the transfer is positive. Thus the contract becomes stationary with the transfer positive such that the
transnational corporation's expected profits are zero each period. Alternatively if efficiency is attainable,
then once it is reached postponement of the transfer has no further benefit and positive transfers can be
made (the solution is not unique in this case).
The above discussion can be summarized in terms of a simple updating rule which characterizes the
optimal contract. Take any value of V below its steady state level - be it V or V* - and the
corresponding value of I. Then V remains constant in state s (Vg = V) and t& = 0 unless the host country's
self-enforcing constraint is violated (r(I;s) > otV) in which case utility must be increased to just the
confiscation utility (t + aV = r(I;s)). Overall expected utility must equal V, so there is only one value of I
consistent with this rule. So the investment level can be easily calculated. It follows that I is a strictly
increasing function of V and thus increases with positive probability each period until either I* or
Li>Y
=^ni!.Y) < I* is reached depending on which case is applicable. Of course investment remains the
same if V does not change. Note that when I* is sustainable it will be attained with probability one in the
optimal contract but this does not mean the the optimal contract is first-best, since investment is intially
underprovided and efficiency is only attained in the long run. Not only does investment increases over time
but it is procyclical. To see this notice that a high value of s will produce a large temptation to renege
leading to a larger increase in Vc and hence a large increase in I next period.
PROPOSITION 1: Investment is non-decreasing over time, attaining a maximum value in the steady state
with probability one which may be less than the efficient level. The discounted utility of the host country is also
non-decreasing and transfers are zero until the period before the maximum value of investment is attained.
Once Vm or V* is reached, the contract is stationary; V remains constant with the transfer chosen
appropriately to satisfy the host country's self-enforcing constraints. Therefore if a non-trivial contract
exists at all, there must be a non-trivial stationary contract and if it is possible to attain the efficient level of
investment, there must exist an efficient stationary contract. So the questions of existence and efficiency can
be answered by looking for a non-trivial and an efficient stationary contract. Proposition 2 shows that if an16
Inada condition on the production function holds there is always a non-trivial contract. If on the other hand
E[(r(I;s)/I)] is bounded above in I then there will be a critical value of the discount factor below which no
non-trivial contract exists and above which one always exists. Likewise the efficient level of investment will
be attainable if and only if the discount factor is above some critical value.
PROPOSITION 2: (i) There exists on a*, 0 < a* < 1, such that a stationary contract at /* exists if and only if
1 > a> a*, (ii) Ifr(0;s) = 0 and r*(I;s)-+ a> as I-*0for all s, then there exists a non-trivial stationary contract for
all ae (0,1). (Hi) IfE[(r(I;s)/I)] is bounded above then there exists an a', 0<a'<l, such that a non-trivial
stationary contract exists if and only ifl>a>a\
Since V does not decreases over time, the optimal value, U(V) depends only on its properties above V.
This means it is possible to calculate the optimal value function by working backward from Vmax.
Consider then a simple example with two equi-probable states in which r(I;l) = 0 and r(I;2) = 4/1, so
I* = 1. The assumption that output is always zero in state one makes everything much simpler since t^ = 0
and the host country's constraint does not bind, implying V^ = V. Further it can be shown that it is optimal
to set I = min (l,V
2(2-a)
2/16), V2 = min (V^V) and ^ = maxO^B^V-V*)), where B = «/(2-a) and that





for n = l,2,...,m, where m is the number such that V^e^V*^
111'
1^*]. It can be checked that this
function is continuous and concave.
The example does not quite meet the conditions of Proposition 2(i), nevertheless it is easy to show that
a non-trivial contract exists for all a so that there are just two cases to consider depending on whether the
efficient level of investment is sustainable or not. First consider the value of Vmax and suppose 1 = 1. Since
U(Vmax) =0, t2 = 2 so that Vmax=l/(l-a). For this to be feasible requires t2 + aVmax>4 or a>2/3.
Further the constraint will not bind provided t2+aV2 ^ 4. But since t1 = 0 and Vj = V, t2 + aV2=V(2-a)
so that I = 1 for any V^ 4/(2-a). Therefore for a> 2/3, U(V) is linear in the range EQ = [V*,Vmax] where17
V* = 4/(2-a). This means for VEEQ the choice of V2 and ^ is not uniquely defined. Further from Lemma
8, U(V) is everywhere differentiate as can be easily checked. An example for the discount factor a = 7/8 is
drawn in Figure 3a. In this case m = 3, V^ = 1.81 and the regions of V are: EQ = [3.55,8], E1 = [2.77,3.55),
E2 = [2.15,2.77), £3 = [1.81,2.15).
In the other case a < 2/3 it is not possible to attain the efficient level of investment and the self-
enforcing constraint binds at V = Vmax. Then V* = Vmax=8a/(2-a)
2 and V(2-a) = ^ + aV2 = 4/1 or
I = V
2(2-a)
2/16. For this value of V*, U(V) is not differentiate at 6
nV* but is still concave. The value
function for a discount factor of a = 5/8 is drawn in Figure 3b. Here m = 2, Vmjn = 0.91 and F* = [1.2,2.65]
and F2 = [0.91,1.2).
4. RISK AVERSE HOST COUNTRY
In this section it is assumed that the host country is risk averse. This is a natural assumption to make
for a developing country engaging in a large project. It is likely to have limited technical resources and
limited access to capital markets. Further export earnings may be heavily dependent on one or two
unstable markets.
The appendix shows how to extend the results of the previous section to the case of a risk averse host
country. A condition on the relative curvatures of the production and utility functions is, however, needed
to prove that U is concave.
ASSUMPTION B: The host country has a Cr, strictly concave, per-period, utility junction v(t) defined over
the transfer t, v(0) = 0; uncertainty is multiplicative, r(I;s) =g(s)r(I), and {((r(r)-r(I))/r'(I))-(F-I)}
-E[((v(g(s)r(I>))-v(g(s)r(I)))/v>(^^
Roughly this says that the host country cannot be too risk averse relative to the concavity of the
production function: in the neighbourhood of unconstraind efficient investment the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion of the host country should be smaller than the coefficient of absolute risk averion of the
transnational corporation.
The results are not too different from those given for the risk neutral case. First unlike the risk neutral
case the transfer is not necessarily zero in the initial periods and although the expected value of the
transfer is non-decreasing over time, the actual transfer may fall if a bad state occurs. Second to prove that18
investment is lower than the efficient level in the risk averse case is more difficult than in the risk neutral
case. In fact it is no longer clear what is meant by this comparison since even in the absence of the
self-enforcing constraints investment will vary with the level of utility given to the host country because of
the non-negativity constraints (2.1)-(2.2). A comparison will therefore be made between the second-best
contract which gives the host country a net future utility of V and the first-best contract which gives the
host country V in the absence of the self-enforcing constraints (2.3) and (2.4). The latter function will be
denoted by I*(V). In the risk neutral case this was a constant function I*(V) =1*. Consistent with the
notation of the previous section we let V* be the lowest value such that it is possible to sustain the first-best
andletI*=I(V*)
PROPOSITION 3:1(V) < I*(V) for V< V*.
Investment is still non-decreasing over time, indeed it can be shown that investment increases with
positive probability in each period if efficiency is sustainable, so that the efficient level of investment I(V*)
is approached but never quite reached. If efficiency is not sustainable then I(Vmax) is attained with
probability one.
PROPOSITION 4: i) If a static efficient contract is sustainable, that is there exists aV*^ Vma£
 tnen V*-+V*
and F-+I* with probability one, where I*=I(V*), and each increasing with positive probability in each period
(soV
r<V* and f<I*). ii) If no static efficient contract is sustainable then V* = Vmax eventually with
probability one.
5. CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
Capital accumulation can be introduced in a simple manner by assuming that start of period
investment adds to current capital stock and that a constant fraction 8 >0 of the inherited capital stock
depreciates. Capital stock at time T is then K
T = (1-8)1^ + I
T and the model of Section 3 is covered by the
special case of 8 = 1 . To choose the optimal capital stock the transnational corporation must take into
account its user cost, c=a(r + 8), where r = (l-a)/a is the interest carrying cost and 8 is the depreciation
cost, and the sum is multiplied by a to convert it into current period dollars. As before it is assumed that
19. For simplicity we treat only the risk neutral case in this section.19
there is a unique positive K* maximizing Er(K;s)-cK such that the expected value of output covers
investment costs, I* =8K*, that is Er(K*;s)-8K* >0. The maximand in the dynamic programming problem
20 becomes -cK+E[r(K;s)-tg + aU(Vs)] and the transnational corporation's participation constraint in state
s is U(Vg) + (1-8)K> 0 which includes the value of the future capital stock .
The host country when it expropriates inherits the capital stock. We shall let D(K;s) be the benefit to
the host country when it expropriates if the capital stock is K and the state is s. The self-enforcing
constraint for the host country in state s is t + aV > D(K;s). If, for example, the host country is unable to
use the capital without the transnational's expertise, D(K;s) = r(K;s) + (1-8)K, the value of current output
plus the scrap value of future capital in a perfect market. For simplicity it is assumed that D"(K;s) 2: r"(K;s)
for each K and s. Then Lemma 2 can be used mutatis mutandis to prove that U(V) is concave.
As before there will be some maximal capital stock which can be sustained by a self-enforcing contract.
Provided D(K;s) is bounded above the efficient capital stock, K* will be sustainable for a high enough
discount factor, although it should be noticed that in this case K* is itself increasing in a since an increase
in a decreases the interest carrying costs of capital. It will be assumed that the initial capital stock is less
than the maximum sustainable level, K < min(K*,Km ) where K_ is the maximum attainable capital
stock if K* cannot be sustained. This then justifies not introducing a non-negativity constraint on
investment, 12:0, since such a constraint will not be binding at the optimum. Equations (3.2) and (3.3)
apply unaltered so it is easy to see that the capital stock increases ratchet like with positive probability each
period up to its maximum value (that is investment always covers depreciation and net investment is
positive with positive probability) . In the long-run a steady-state is attained with I = Smki^K*,!^ ).
That the efficient capital stock is not attained instantaneously is often attributed to adjustment costs (see
e.g. Gould, 1968). The slow adjustment here is caused by the absence of a legally binding contract.
20. This can be shown by explicitly treating K as a state variable in the value function and integrating the
envelope condition for K, taking the first order conditions into account. Then the value function given V
7
and K equals UCV
7^) + (1-8)1^, where U(V
T) is the value function when the inherited capital stock is
zero. Intuitively, for each value of V
7 there is a best level of K
7, so an amount (1-8)K
T" of current
investment is saved, and this is added to discounted profits.
21. It can thus be seen that V Y is increasing in K*
22. It does not pay to increase capital above K*. The only reason for doing so would be to relax the
transnational corporation's partiqipation constraint. But since <r£.l, any gain in V would be matched by at
le^st as big a fall in U.20
6. RENGOTIATION-PROOFNESS
The solution identified above is not renegotiation-proof despite being confined to the Pareto frontier
of the set of all equilibrium payoffs. The reason is simple: the punishment meted out to the host country
when it reneges, to be cut off from all future investment, is Pareto dominated by points on the second-best
frontier , and would therefore be subject to renegotiation. The most severe punishment which can be
imposed is Vmjn; anything lower by definition also gives the transnational corporation a lower payoff.
It is nevertheless possible to find a renegotiation-proof set of equilibria by replacing zero on the RHS
of (2.3) by VTr|jn. Any fixed point of the mapping corresponds to a set of payoffs which is weakly
renegotiation-proof (Farrell and Maskin, 1987) since no payoff Pareto dominates any other and each
payoff corresponds to an equilibrium in which all continuation payoffs also belong to the set.
As an example we solve the one state case with r(I) =/l and a risk neutral host country. Then I* = 1/4,
and attention will be restricted to the case where efficiency is sustainable at some point in the set. Working
backwards as in the example of Section 3 for a given value of Vj^, and computing the new value of V^^,
it is straightforward to show that there is a unique fixed point which, using the same notation as before,






























e Vmm=a/2(l + a-2a
2). Notice
that this solution is only valid (EQ is an interval) if a£ /0.5, whereas without imposing renegotiation-
proofness the efficient level of investment is sustainable for a^ 0.5. Since the set of payoffs (the graph of
URp(V) for Ve[Vmm,l/4(l-a)]) includes part of the unconstrained first-best frontier it satisfies the
stronger definition of renegotiation-proofness given by van Damme (1987) which additionally requires that
no point in any other weakly renegotiation-proof set Pareto dominates the whole set .
What is interesting here is that the equilibrium outcome path has exactly the same qualitative
characteristics as that analysed in earlier sections, since it is derived from the same dynamic programm
except for the addition of a constant into the constraint (2.3).
23. This is not true of the wage-contracts model in Thomas and Worrall (1988): it is shown in Asheim and
Strand (1989) that the solution identified there does satisfy renegotiation-proofness.
24. We have not been able to establish strong renegotiation-proofhess, although we suspect it to be true.21
The impact of renegotiation-proofness on utilities is illustrated for a=0.9 in Figure 4 . It is also
interesting to consider what happens for high discount factors. First multiply payoffs by (1-a) to normalise.
Then V • =a/2(l + 2a) which tends to 1/6 as a tends to one, while Vm.= 1/4 for all a^/0.5, so Upp
converges to that part of the first-best frontier on [1/6,1/4] whereas U converges to the entire frontier by
the folk-theorem.
APPENDIX
Define V as the largest discounted utility the host country can receive in the first-best
(unconstrained) problem, subject to giving the investor zero utility. In the space of bounded functions on
[0,V ] consider some decreasing concave not necessarily differentiable function P and define the mapping
L as follows.
(A.1) L(P)(Y)= max {-I + E[r(I;s)-t + aP(V)]}
I (t V ^
subject to:
(A.2) E[v(ts)+aVs]>V :CT
(A3) v(ts)-v(r(I;s)) + aVs>0, s = l,2,...,N :V&iL&
(A.4) P(Vs)>0, s = l,2,...,N :aps<ps
(A.5) r(I;s)-ts>0, s-l,2,...,N :ps9s
(A.6) ts>0, s = l,2,...,N :psiTs
The first order conditions are:
(A.7) E[r'(I;s)(l-n,sV(r(I;s)) + 6s)] = l
(A.8) ex + PLS + (V6s)/V(ts) = W(ts) s = 1,2,...,N
25. To find U(V), set V^ = 0 in the definition of URp(V).22
(A.9) s s
together with an envelope condition
-<redL(P)(V)
where 3P(V) denotes the set of the superdifferentials of P at V. This set is a single point for almost every
value of V if P is concave. At such points let crs = -P'(VS).
This is not a standard concave programming problem even when P is concave because the
self-enforcing constraint (A.4) means that the constraint set is not convex, Neither, unfortunately is L a
contraction mapping in the supremum metric, despite the presence of strict discounting, because L has
more than one fixed point when a non-trivial contract exists, the zero function being one, and U itself
another. Technically, the reason for this is the presence of the value function itself in the constraints (in
(A.4)). Nevertheless the following can be proved:
LEMMA 1: Define P* as the unconstrained first-best Pareto frontier for the problem without constraints
(A.3) and (A.4). Then L
n(P) convergespointwise toUasn-+oo.
PROOF: (i) Notice that when P* is the first-best frontier L(P*) <, P*.







The constraint set in the latter case is at least as large as in the former, so L(L (P*)) ^ L(L
n(P*)); i.e.
L
n(P*) > L (P*), thus completing the induction assumption.
(iii) Hence L
n(P*) is a decreasing sequence, and must therefore converge pointwise to some limit
function, say U°.
(iv) U° is a fixed point of L. To see this, consider for any fixed V, the sequence of variables chosen at
each application of L: (I
n,(ts
n,Vs





 1(P*) <, L
n(P*)
the constraint (A.3) does not relax as n increases. Hence the sequence belongs to a compact set and has a
convergent subsequence, converging to, say, (I*,(ts*,Vg*)). We have L
n (P*)(Vg
n) >0, for each n in the
subsequence, so in the limit U°(V*) > 0, for each s, and the limit contract clearly satisfies all other
constraints in the problem L(U°)(V), and gives the transnational corporation a utility of U°(V).23
Consequently LU°(V) £ U°(V). However since L
11"
1^*) 2s L
n(P*) £... s> U°, we have L
n(P*) S> L(U°), and
taking the limit as n-> oo, U°> L(U°). So U° = L(U°).
(v) Every fixed point U of L corresponds to a family of self-enforcing contracts in the sense that there
is a self-enforcing contract which gives the host country a discounted utility of V, and the transnational
1 1
corporation, U (V), for any V satisfying Vst 0, U (V) £ 0. Consider the contract formed by the repeated
application of L, starting from utility V, so that the variables in the first period of the contract are the I and
ts(l)'s that solve Problem A from V; the second period contract, contingent upon s(l) occurring in the first
period, is then the solution to Problem A from Vs(l), and so on. As in any discounted programming
problem, this contract must deliver V and U (V) respectively to the two parties, and this same argument
guarantees that because constraints (A3) and (A.4) are satisfied at each point in the future, the self-
enforcing constraints proper are satisfied. All other constraints are clearly also met, so this contract is as
required.
(vi) Since P* ;> U, L
n(P*) ^ L
n(U) = U, and in the limit U° S> U. From (v) and by definition of U,
therefore, U°=U. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 2: Under Assumption A, U(V) is stricfy decreasing and concave on (Vmin, Vmax].
PROOF: Assume that L P(V) is concave. For a given V, V and corresponding contracts (I,(ts,Vs)),




8 = 81 + (1-8)?, V
8S = 8Vg + (1-8)V'g and
t
8s = 8tg + (l-8)t's + r(I
8)-(8r(I;s) + (l-8)r(F;s)). This new contract is feasible, it satisfies (A.3), and offers
neither the host country or transnational corporation less overall utility. Then L
nP(V) is concave and since
P* is concave and U is the pointwise limit of L
nP* from Lemma 1, U(V) is itself concave. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 3: Under Assumption A, (i) <j<lfor VE [Vmin, VmaxJ and (ii) Qs = Ofor alls.
PROOF: (i) Suppose that CT > 1. From (A.8) 6S = (cr-1) + IL& + irs > 0 for all s, so that tg = r(I;s). By
concavity if CT > 1 anywhere then at Vmax. If <p& > 0 then Vg = Vmax so U(Vg) = 0. If <pg = 0, then from (A.9)
-(a + |Xg) e 3U(Vg) which implies -inf 3U(Vg) > 1 so that in the next period 8g>0 and again ts = r(I;s) for
all s and so on. Thus the transnational corporation cannot make positve profits at any stage and would not
invest. Thus a ^1.24
(ii) If 8g > 0 then as CT ^ 1, either jig or irs is strictly positive. By complementary slackness trs=O.If
[L > 0 then (A3) binds, and as (A.5) binds too, V.=0, which is inefficient, implying |i = 0. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 4: Under Assumption A, if for some V, there exists (t«V ) such that I* is sustainable then Uis
linear with slope -1 on (V, Vmax] and if V* is the smallest such Vthen U is strictly concave on (V^^ V*) with
/</*. If no such V exists then Uis strictly concave on (V-^Vmm,) with /</*.
PROOF: Suppose U is linear on some interval (V,V) and consider the contracts (I,(t ,V )) and
(I',(t's,V's)). First suppose I< I*. Then from (A.7), JJLS >0 for some s and CT< 1. Then from linearity & < 1
implying F < I*. Moreover since U is strictly decreasing the contract (I ,(t g,V g)) defined in Lemma 2
satisfies V(\fi) £ U(V
8 + E[r(I
8)-(8r(I;s) + (l-8)r(F;s))]) £ 8U(V) + (1-8)U(V) which can only hold with
equality if I = F. From (A.7) and using the implicit function theorem |x-s is a continuous function of I and
hence JJLC = |x'. If jic > 0, tc + aVc = r(I;s) = r(F;s) = t' + aV' If jx = 0, then irc = TT'C > 0 since a=& < 1 aSooaa So aa .
from (A.8). Then ts = t's and Vse(V,V) from (A.9) and (A.10). But then
E[ | (tg + aVs)-(t'g + aV's) | ] <, \ V-V | as a< 1, which contradict (A.2). Now consider the interval (V*,V)
where at V* investment is at the efficient level. By definition CT* = 1. But a ^ 1 from Lemma 3 and since U is
concave from Lemma 2 it follws that at any V > V* I=I* and or=1. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 5: Under Assumption A, if\i>0 then ix. ^ v*nfor alls>q. If IT >0 then tr ^ ir /or s < q.
PROOF: Suppose jx_< |x_,. From (A.8) TT-ir_ = |x_-ix. >0. So tr. >Trn S: 0 and t. = 0. Then
aV_ ^ r(I;s) > r(I;q) = t_ + aV ^ aV and V > V . As a< 1 and or< 1 and U is strictly concave we have
s 4 4 4
 5 4.
-CTS < -CT for all -(JS<E 3U(VS) and -a• e 3U(V ). Then -CTg(l + <pg) + |xg < -a + (x . Therefore equation
(A.9) can only be satisfied if <p > 0. But this implies V = Vmax which contradicts Vg > V .
Suppose irg < IT . From (A.7), M-s-|x = ^g-^s > 0- So jxg > |x ^ 0. As t = 0,
aVn ^ r(I;q) > r(I;q) = te + aVc ^ aVc and Vo > Vc. As before -ov> -CT_ for all -a.G 3U(V.) and OS'S o Uo olJ o o
-CT• e 3U(V ). Thus -CT& + jxg > -o-_(l + (p ) + (JL so that (A.9) can only be satisfied if (pg > 0, implying
V= VmaT which contradicts VO>VC. Q.E.D.25
LEMMA 6: Under Assumption A,t>0 iff-'te d U(VJ
s s •
PROOF: aU(Vmax) = [-l,-crmax]. If ts>0 then n,g = 1-a. If cp&>0 then V = Vmaxand -l€=3U(Vmax). If
<Ps = 0 then from (A.9) -leaU(Vmax). If -le3U(Vmax) then Vg< Vmax, <ps = 0 and p-s + or<l, so that
us>0 and tg = 0 from (A.8). Q.E.D.
LEMMA 7: Under Assumption A, I is strictly increasing in Vfor V< min (V*, Vmax) <md 1=1* otherwise;
V. and tc are non-decreasing in V.
PROOF: Consider V_. __ > V > V. First suppose V' < V. < V^..... Then a>\=0 and since by assumption
(7
>>awe have from (A.9) |xg > |x'g > 0. Then from (A.7), I' > I. Since Vg < Vmax, t'g = 0 from Lemma .
Therfore te + aVc = r(I;s) < r(I';s) < aV'c. This implies tc < a(V -V) < 0, a contradiction. Therefore s s s s s s
V >V . s s
Suppose \L\ > |x. > 0, then from (A.7), I' < I. From the first part of the proof V_av£ V' £ Vc, so that
CTWOV^ a'c > CTC. First consider or < amov. Then tc = 0, so t'e + aV'c = r(I';s) < r(I;s) <, aVe. But since HldA So S mdA a S S S
V's ^ Vg this implies t'g < 0 which is impossible. If crg = o"max, then t's-ts < 0. But from (A.8) irs > ir's ^ 0
since (f > CT, again implying t'_ < 0. Thus JJL. 5: JJL' > 0 and F >: I, and from Lemma if cr< 1,1< F > I*.
Now suppose tc > t' > 0. From Lemma 6, -le dU(Vc), but V' > Vc from above. If V' > Vc then the
intersection of aU(V's) and 3U(VS) is empty since U is strictly concave. But a < 1, so -ledU(Vs), a
('
contradiction. If V' = V. on the other hand, from (A.8) a. > |x' ^ 0 as a* > o\ Then
S S S S i -
tc + aV =r(I;s)<r(F;s)<St' +aV' or te<t' a contradiction. Q.E.D.
ss s sss
Proof of Proposition 1: If the efficient level of investment is attanable then |xs-+0 along all paths since
V
7 is increasing over time. If V
7 < V* for all T then t. = 0 for all T which is impossible. So V^tV^V ]
with probability one. Equally if the efficient level of investment is not sustainable V = V^,-.. eventually with
probability one. The rest of the Proposition follows directly. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 8: Under Assumption A, tfvmax=h »'•«•' V*-VrnaX
 tfien U is everywhere differentiable.
PROOF: Since Vg is non-decreasing over time in the interval VelVj^V*), and attains some
Ve[V*,Vm.v] where dU(V) is unique and equal to -1 and <p = 0, then a is also unique. Q.E.D.26
Proof of Proposition 2: For a stationary contract (I,(t.)) to be feasible it must satisfy
s =
(i) The first thing to notice about the constraints is that as at least one t > 0 they are strictly relaxed as
a increases. At I*, -l + Er(I*;s)/I* >0. So consider (tg) such that (A.12) and (A.13) are satisfied where at
least one t > 0 since V > 0. Therefore for a near enough one (A.11) will be satisfied. On the other hand for
a near enough zero (A.11)-(A.13) cannot hold simultaneously: from (A.11)
(r(I*;s)/I*)-(ts/I*) <; ((a/(l-a))E[ts/I*] and from (A.12) ((a/(l-a))Ejyi*] <S ((a/(l-a))E[(r(I*;s)/I*)-l]
which can be made less than one for a small enough, so (r(I*;s)/I*)-(ts/I*) < 1 which contradicts (A.12)
(ii) Set tg = r(I;s), s < N and tN = r(I;N)-I/pN. Then (A.12) holds with equality, (A.11) holds for s < N
and if s = N, then -(1/pjq) + ((a/(l-a))E[(r(I;s)/I)-l] £ 0, which is satisfied if I is small enough since
E[r(T,s)/I]-> oo as I-+0. Likewise (A.13) holds for s < N and for s=N it becomes
r(I;N)/I> (r(I;N)/)I-(l/p^) ^0, which again holds for I small enough. Thus for any ae(0,l) there is a
feasible stationary contract with I > 0.
(iii) By assumption there is some (I,(t.)) satisfying (A.12) and (A.13) with at least one tg >0. The proof
proceeds along the lines of part (i) given that E[(r(I;s)/I)-l] is bounded above. Q.E.D.
n
LEMMA 9: Under Assumption B, L P(V) is concave.
PROOF: Consider any two values V and V and the associated contracts (I,(ts,Vs)) and (F,(t's,Vs)).
(A.14) L
nP(V0-L





Consider each of the three terms on the RHS in turn.
i) Let $s(r-I) = (r(r;s)-r(I;s))-r'(I;s)(F-I). <S>S(T-I) ^ 0 with equality iff V = I, since r(I;s) is strictly
concave and differentiable in I. Similarly let ftg(r-I) = (v(r(I';s)-v(r(I;s)) v*(r(I;s))(r(r;s)-r(I;s)). Again
CIJV'X) <. 0 with equality iff I' = I, since v is differentiable. Multiplying both sides of (A.7) by (T-I) gives s27
(F-I) = (F-I)E[(1 + 6s-^sv'(r(I;s))r'(I;s)] = ss




ii) From (A.5) and (A.6), 6s(r(I;s)-ts) = 0 < es(r(T;s)-t's) and tr^=0 < -n^t^ by complementary
slackness. Therefore -(t's-ts) < -(l-irs + 6s)(t's-ts) + 6s(r(F;s)-r(I;s)). But from (A.8),
-(l-irs + es) = -(a + }JLs)v'(ts). So -(l-Trs + es)(t's-ts) = -(a + jis)v'(ts)(rs-ts) ^-(cr + ns)(v(t's)-v(ts)) since vis concave. Therefore combining terms and taking expectations
iii) From (A.4) <p i/^PCVg) = 0 < (p^
11'
1?^'^ = 0. So L
n"









Then substituting (A.15), (A.16), (A.17) into (A.14) gives
L
nP(V')-L
nP(V) s E[p.s(v(ts) + aVs-v(r(I;s)))]-E[tJLs(v(t'J
But from (A.4), E[v(ts) + aVg] = V and E[v(t'g) + aV'J = V and from (A.4)






With the assumption r(I;s) = g(s)r(I), <Dg(T-I) = g(s)$(r-I), where <D(I'-I) = [(r(T)-r(I))-r'(I)(I'-I)]. Then28
using (A.7). From (A.8) ^(y = 1 + 0s-Trs-oV(ts) < 1 + 8g. Since 9$|xs=0 and tg £ r(I;s) from (A.4),
<; 1. Then as OS(T-I) 5=0, -M.gng(T-I) ^^^-1)^(1(1^)). So
This latter term is non-positive by assumption B with equality iff F = I. This proves that U itself is
concave since P* is concave and from Lemma 1, U is the pointwise limit of a sequence of concave
functions. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 10: Under Assumption B, there is a unique value of I which solves the dynamic program and hence
I is a continuous function of V.
PROOF: Setting V = V in (A.18) implies that there is a unique solution for I. Thus from the maximum
theorem I is continuous in V. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 11: Under Assumption B, each |xg and 6g are continuous functions ofV.
PROOF: From (A.7) and using the implicit function theorem, given r"(I;s) < 0, implies that p& and 8
are continuous functions of I. Then use Lemma 10 that I is a continuous function of V. Q.E.D.
Now consider the following sub-problem of choosing (t,V) to maximize y-t + aU(V) subject to:
U(V) > 0, v(t) + aV-v(y) > 0, t < y and t > 0 with multipliers «<£, jx, 8, and ir where a bar beneath the
multiplier denotes that it refers to this sub-problem and let Q(y) be the maximum function and let
cr(y) = -U'(V). The solution (t, V) corresponds to the optimal way of giving the host country the minimum
gain when output is known to be y. Assuming that the undominated part of U is concave, then it is a
standard concave programming problem with Q(y) increasing and concave. With U'(V) >0 and V>0, (|=0
and it > 0. If v is strictly concave then t and V are unique and thus continuous functions of y with
Q'(y) = l-}xrf(y). Some properties of the solution will be useful later
LEMMA 12: (i) landVare non-decreasing functions ofy; (ii) jxw a non-decreasing function ofy; (Hi) If
TT>0, <£.= 0then V-v(y)loL, Z/TT=£.= 0, then Vsolves v~




Since from Lemma 10 for each level of V there is a unique optimal value for I, and hence letting
y = r(I;s) the above sub-problem can be solved for each s. Use an s, subscript to denote the solution: thus
Vy, jXy etc. The dependence of the solutions upon V may be stessed by writing cr^V) for example.
LEMMA 13: For a given value of Vand hence a given value ofl(i) if V
<K&
 tnen ^s ~¥c
 an^ ^s
 > ® ^ *f




PROOF: (i) Assume V <}L and jx = 0. From (A8) 1/V(tc) - u+(IT-6CW(tc), so
ts = max{0,min{t((j),r(I;s)}}. From the solution to the sub-problem, W(tg) = (1 + <£^)ss + (Mg'^^Q^)*
 S
O
tg > t^) or tg = r(I;s) if r(I;s) < t(Og) or tg > 0 if t(cQ < 0. Thus since CT < Og, tg < tg. In either case Vg > Vg, a
contradiction. Consequently |xg > 0 and by the principle of optimality 3U(Vg) = SUQ^) or Vg = Vg.
(ii) Suppose c
r<CTmax- Since by assumption cr^Og, we have 2s
<ormax>
 s
o that JJLS and cpg cannot both
be positive (as it would imply o. = or and a. =crrn4lv). If |xc >0, a_ = a_ ^CT. But from (All) jxc >0 implies
s s s mdA o s o s
ao > a, a contradiction, so u,e = 0. Equally, if q>c > 0, a_ = CT_. _ „ > a, while from (All) ar_ < a, a
contradiction, so <p = 0. Thus from (All), a = a. If cr = crm' then if additionally ag < crmax, from (All)
we have (p. > 0, a contradiction, so a. = or,™. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 14: Under Assumption B, the limit function U is strictly concave.
PROOF:Suppose U is linear over some interval [V,V]. Then U(V')-U(V) = U'(V)(V'-V). From Lemma
4 this can only happen if tc =?= t'c and I = F. From Lemma 7, V. is a continuous function of I and hence does
not change. Thus if ac > 0, Vc = V' = V., or I V-V' I = 0. On the other hand if jx = 0, then
| Vs-V's I < I V-V I. Thus oE[Vs-V's] < V-V which contradicts equation (A.2). Q.E.D.
LEMMA 15: Under Assumption B, Us increasing in V.
Proof:Suppose F < I and V < V. Then 8'g => 6S and l-|x'sv'(r(F;s)) ^ l-jxsv'(r(I;s)). First consider 8's and
6O. Suppose 6' < 6C. If 9' > 0 then from equation (A.8) a = (1 + ej/vYt.) and or* = (1 + 8' )/V(t'J. Since
tc = r(I;s) >r(F;s) = t' WftJ > W(t'_). But then (1 + 8.) > (1 + 8') implies <r> & which contradicts V< V
S S S 5 o o
since U(V) is concave. If 8's = 0 then & <> <? + }i's = (l-w^Cty < W(t's). But tg > t'g so W(tg) > W(t's)
where 1/^(0 < (1 + O^/VCtg) = CT. Thus again CT' < cr a contradiction. Now Q'(y) = l-jyiv'(y), and since Q is
concave l-ikV(y') > l-jxy(y). Since jx is equal either to jyig or zero it can be inferred that30
1-jx* v*(r(T;s)) £ 1-JJL vYr(I;s)) provided jx' =ji' and a_=0 does not occur. But this can be ruled out since
»t
f8s-p.s. Then as r'(F;s) >r'(I;s) we have Etr'a^sXl-^/Cr^Js) + 9's)] >E[r'(I;s)(l-jisv
>(ra;s) + 8S)] which
contradicts equation (A.7) that both should equal unity. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose I(V) ^ I*(V). The unconstrained case must have a stationary solution.
If cr £ CT*, from (A.7) tg £ t*s for all s, and since |xg > 0, Vg > V; so that the borrower's utility is higher in the
constrained case - contrary to assumption. Hence a<cr*. Then 6_ ^8* ; since if u,_ >0,8_=0 and when
S a S S
\i = 0, a + |x = or < a*, which implies 8g <• 8* from (A.5) and (A.8) (since if (A.5) binds in the constrained
case, tgS: t*s). But Q&^ 8*g for all s and [i&>0 for some s implies from (A.7) that I(V) <I*(V), a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: (i)(a) At V*, by the updating rule of Lemma 13(i), ^(V*) ^o-(V*) for all s,
since otherwise V* could not be a steady-state. But u. is strictly increasing in I up to the point where
Vj = Vmax and hence, since I(V) <I*(V) for V< V*, we havep^V) <ory(V*) and sog^V)<a(V*) for all
s. So as a(V) < CT(V*), by the updating rule cxs(V) < or(V*), and so also Vg < V*.
(b) Next consider V as a stochastic process {V
T}7 > Q. Note that <ps ~ 0 as V < V*. So from (A.11)
^S(V) - aCV
 + ^-crCV




e l^sC^)"*^ along all paths. Moreover state N occurs
infinitely often with probability one, so on almost all paths, by choosing those dates when state N occurs,
there is a convergent subsequence of V^s such that iij^V)-*-©. For any such path ^(Um V
T)=0 by the
continuity of p^ in V, Lemma 11. This implies |i-s(hm V
1) = 0 for all s since JJLJ^ > \L$ for all s. Hence
efficiency is attained at lim V which in view of part (a) must be V*. So V
T-»>V* and F-tPfy*) with
probability one.
(ii) Given that V
7 is non-decreasing, V
1 = Vmax eventually with probability one unless
Prob{ V < Vm.v all T} > 0. The latter implies Prob{lim ^JV
7) = 0} > 0, but by the argument of part (b)
this means V
7 converges to a value with ^=0 with positive probability. This is impossible since such a
point would be efficient, contrary to asssumption. Q.E.D.31
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FIGURE 4 - A RENEGOTIATION PROOF SET